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HOUSEHOLD VERSUS INDIVIDUAL VALUATION: WHAT’S THE 
DIFFERENCE? 
 
Abstract. 
Standard practice in stated preference typically blurs the distinction between household 
and individual responses, but without a clear theoretical or empirical justification for this 
approach. To date there have been no empirical tests of whether values for say a two adult 
household elicited by interviewing one randomly selected adult are the same as the values 
generated by interviewing both adults simultaneously. Using cohabiting couples, we 
conduct a choice experiment field study valuing reductions in dietary health risks. In one 
treatment a random individual is chosen from the couple and interviewed alone; in the 
other treatment, both partners are questioned jointly. We find significant differences in 
household values calculated from joint as opposed to individual responses, with further 
variation between the values elicited from men and women. Our results question the 
assumption, implicit in common practice, that differences between individually and 
jointly elicited estimates of household values can effectively be ignored.  
 
Keywords: Household values, choice experiment, contingent valuation, food and health 
risks . 
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Introduction. 
As typically conducted, the stated preference technique blurs the distinction between the 
individual and the household. Most commonly, an adult is picked at random from the household 
and asked to provide information on the valuation of a change in a public or private good. In some 
methods (e.g. mail-based surveys), no control is placed over who answers the valuation questions. 
In both types of case, data on household composition and size may be obtained and used in 
modelling willingness to pay (wtp) or willingness to accept (wta), but no formal distinction is 
made between individual and household valuation.1 
An approach that does not distinguish between answers given by the individual and 
household may be justifiable on two grounds. First, in some economic theories the choices made 
by the household as a whole and those made by individuals within the household are identical. For 
instance in the Becker [7] or unitary model of the household, incentives are aligned in such a way 
that individuals act as if they are maximizing a household utility function. The unitary model 
exhibits the more general property of income pooling, meaning that choices made by the 
household are independent of the source of income. Income pooling is the key feature that implies 
an identity between the stated valuations of households and their component parts (Munro, [25]). If 
economic theories satisfying income pooling provide a true model of household decision-making, 
then individual and household expressions of value will coincide and the identity of the unit or 
                                                 
1 As an example consider for instance, a careful and thorough recent report on valuation of bathing 
water quality in the UK, in which subjects receive the prompt: “Considering whether the cost of 
the additional measures is worth it to your household; please tell me, for each card, which scenario 
would you prefer to see in place in a typical British beach?” (Defra, [12]). In a quick survey of 
articles published in two leading environmental economics journals in 2005 we found 8 out of 13 
valuation papers mixed references to the individual respondent with the household’s valuation. 
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sub-unit of the household which provides stated preference information is immaterial. 
Alternatively, even if economic theories of the household which predict equivalence between 
individual and household expressions of welfare are proved wrong, as a practical measure, the 
difference between measures of value elicited from individuals and the household may be so small 
as to justify the existing standard practice. As an example, household willingness to pay might be a 
simple average of the individual willingness to pay figures for the adults within the household, in 
which case a random selection of subject would provide a consistent estimate of household wtp.2  
The evidence to date is mixed on the most appropriate model of the household, but it is 
largely against the unitary model of the household and income pooling. For instance, using the 
natural experiment provided by a reform of the UK tax and benefit system, Lundberg et al. [23] 
reject income pooling, showing instead that expenditure on goods such as men’s and women’s 
clothing are sensitive to the source of household income. Their results are supported by Browning 
and Chiappori, [10] and Phipps and Burton [26] where family expenditure data is used to show the 
influence of the source of income on expenditure shares for consumer goods.3  However, a 
problem with interpreting the significance of this work lies in the limitations of the underlying 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, the balance of power within households may not be sensitive to small changes in 
the source of income, in which case for consumption changes of low value, the household may 
exhibit behaviour which is largely indistinguishable from that predicted by income pooling. 
3 Browning and Chiappori, [10], reject the unitary model in favour of the cooperative or Paretian 
alternative, which does not predict income pooling. Other research has not been so positive in its 
assessment of Pareto efficiency. Jones,  [21] rejects it in household allocations in the Cameroon, as 
does Udry, [32] using household farm level data from Burkina Faso, and Udry and  Duflo, [33] for 
farm households in the Côte d'Ivoire. In none of these cases is the unitary model supported.  
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datasets which contain information on household income, but not on wage rates. Differences in 
expenditure patterns may therefore be due to unobserved variation in wage rates rather than the 
observed variation in household income.  
Given the inconclusiveness of results from household survey data, Bateman and Munro, 
[4], [5] pioneer experimental tests of household decision-making, using choices in which the 
identity of the income recipient is manipulated. Among other results, these prove wrong models of 
the household that predict coincidence between individual and household valuation measures. The 
results are based on laboratory-based using choices, which though real, are not the typical objects 
of valuation in stated preference exercises. So, to date there have been no stated preference field 
survey specifically designed to see if there is a significant quantitative difference between the 
values elicited from different component parts of a household.4 
This paper reports on an exercise designed to provide such a test. We conduct a choice 
experiment to value reductions in dietary health risks. Our entire sample consists of cohabiting 
couples, both married and unmarried. In one treatment a randomly selected individual is chosen 
from the couple and takes part in a face-to-face interview, providing responses on behalf of the 
household. In the other treatment, both partners are asked household choice questions jointly, 
again in a face-to-face interview. We find significant differences in the values elicited from the 
two treatments. Moreover, the values elicited from couples are not a simple average of those 
                                                 
4 In the marketing literature there is a small number of papers looking at the related issue of who 
has influence in household decision-making but without a focus on testing particular theories. See 
in particular Arora and Allenby [3] and Dellaert et al, [13]. In a pioneering paper, Dosman and 
Adamowicz, [14], compare stated preference data over camp site features obtained from individual 
partners to the revealed household destination choices.  
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elicited from men and women.5 
Our paper therefore suggests that at least from some goods, there can be significant 
differences in the values elicited from the household as a whole and from its various components. 
 
II Theory. 
In this section we outline the theory that frames the exercise. A fuller version can be found 
in Munro [25]. Consider a two-adult household where for each individual i = 1,2, indirect utility 
depends on their own income, their partner’s income (m1 and m2) and the level of a public good, z. 
All other arguments which would typically enter the indirect utility function are suppressed for 
simplicity as are the details of any altruism within the household and the bargaining and allocation 
process.  
Assume that indirect utility Vi = Vi(z,m1,m2), i = 1,2, has the following properties: 
i. all arguments are essential. e.g. Vi(0,m1,m2) < Vi(z,m1’,m2’) all, z, m1, m2, m1’, m2’. 
ii. Vi is strictly increasing in all arguments when all arguments are strictly positive.  
iii. Vi is continuous in all arguments. 
Note that Vi is a reduced form, in the sense that it shows the relationship between utility, z 
and household incomes, given the unmodelled resource allocation game that is played out within 
the household.6 In other words, it embodies the assumption that in making choices individuals 
anticipate any readjustment of the intra-household allocation that results.  
 
                                                 
5 The final sample consisted only of heterosexual couples. 
6 Smith and van Houtven [28] examine the problem of identifying individual preferences for public 
goods from household decisions in the context of the Pareto efficient household. 
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Income Pooling (IP) is:  for all i, mi, z, say that the household income pools for ∆m when 
Vi(z,m1-∆m, m2+∆m) = Vi(z,m1,m2)  i=1,2. 
For z’  > z > 0 we define individual willingness to pay (iwtpi) as follows:  
iwtp1 : V1(z’,m1-iwtp1, m2) = V1(z,m1,m2),  
iwtp2: V2(z’,m1, m2-iwtp2) = V2(z,m1,m2). 
Individual wtp is therefore the maximum amount that the household member is willing to 
pay to receive the increase in the value of the public good. This definition corresponds to the 
typical format of standard stated preference exercises. 
Household wtp (hwtp) is then defined as the maximum value of wtp1+wtp2 that the 
household jointly and collectively is willing to pay. However, whereas the theory of individual 
valuation is extensive and largely settled, there is no coherent body of valuation theory for the 
multi-agent household, principally because for some models of allocation, household indifference 
curves may not exist (Samuelson [27]). As such, to write down an indirect utility function for the 
household and to define hwtp formal in a manner analogous to the definition for iwtp is to assume  
already some properties of intra-household allocation that may not be true. 
Munro [25] uses the following possible formal definition of hwtp, which we label as hwtpa 
in order to make clear its specific nature. 
hwtpa = max wtp1+wtp2 s.t. Vi(z’,m1-wtp1, m2-wtp2) = Vi(z,m1,m2)  i=1,2.  
In other words, hwtpa is the largest amount of money which can be extracted from a 
household for an increase in the public good, subject to the constraint that each individual is no 
worse off than in the situation without the change. Given this the following can be proved (see [25] 
Proposition 1. For z’, mi > 0, IP ⇒  iwtp1 = iwtp2 = hwtpa 
Proposition 2. iwtp1 = iwtp2 = hwtpa ⇒  IP  
Although in practice we are interested in hwtp and not hwtpa, the propositions provide a 
benchmark model for the paper, demonstrating the link between the empirically suspect income 
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pooling on the one hand and the equivalence of household and individual measures of wtp on the 
other. One implication of the propositions is that with a sample of couples we can test for income 
pooling using either the difference between the iwtp of the partners or by using the difference 
between the iwtp of one partner and that of the household.7 However, our central concern here is 
on the relationship between iwtp and hwtp and for this relationship, the propositions provide 
guidance in one specific situation.  
Let us relabel our sample members by f (=female) or m (=male), then our starting 
hypotheses are as follows: 8 
H1A iwtpi = hwtp i=m,f 
H1B iwtpm = iwtpf  
Outside of income pooling and with other definitions of hwtp the relationship between  
iwtp and hwtp is less clear, although there are a few results available for specific models of 
household decision-making. In Bergstrom, [9], for instance partners have a veto on decisions and 
household wtp is the minimum of individual wtp. We take this as our second hypothesis: 
H2:  hwtp=min(iwtpm , iwtpf) 
Quiggin, [27] and Strand and Aabø, [30] analyse wtp in the context of the Pareto-efficient 
                                                 
7 Some studies have found significant gender effects in willingness to pay (e.g. Teal and 
Loomis, [31] or Dupont, [15]. This does not give a clear insight into the relationship between 
household wtp and individual wtp, except inasmuch that clearly for at least one partner iwtp must 
depart from hwtp. 
 
8 It is worth being explicit: rejection of the first of these hypotheses does not imply 
rejection of income pooling, since hwtp may in fact differ from hwtpa.  
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household and find that in general hwtp equals the sum of individual wtp except where altruism 
between partners is confined to consumption of private goods, in which case hwtp is less than the 
sum of iwtp. We take their general case as the basis of our third hypothesis: 
H3: hwtp = iwtpm + iwtpf 
We noted above that using iwtp might be an acceptable empirical proxy for hwtp if, on 
average iwtp is approximately equal to hwtp. We use this suggestion for our fourth hypothesis: 
H4: hwtp = 0.5(iwtpm + iwtpf) 
An alternative to the random selection of interviewee is a method in which the researcher 
first identifies the relevant decision-maker in the household and interviews them. This method is 
often implicit in, for example, surveys where anglers are asked about their valuation of lakes and 
fish-stocks. An explicit example is Hensher et al, [19] where the household was first asked about 
decision-making responsibilities with regard to utility payments in order to target the 
questionnaire. One way to make sense of this approach is to see it as a means of eliciting hwtp 
without interviewing all householders collectively. Let iwtpT be the wtp figure elicited from the 
target. If the targeting process is accurate and reliable, then iwtpT=hwtp. We take this as our final 
hypothesis, to be tested using information from questions asked about responsibility for food 
purchase choices. 
H4: hwtp = iwtpT. 
 
III Design. 
In the light of the above theory we design an experiment to test our hypotheses using a dual 
treatment design applied to a sample of established couples. In one treatment both partners are 
interviewed together, providing joint estimates of household WTP; in the other treatment one 
partner is chosen at random and interviewed separately.  
  8
Given the stated preference nature of our study the obvious methodological choice was 
between the contingent valuation (CV) and choice experiment9 (CE) approaches. Although our 
design and consequent results should be applicable to both formats, recent interest in the CE 
approach (Adamowicz et al., [1]; Louviere et al. [23], Bennett and Blamey, [8], Bateman et al., [4], 
Holmes and Adamowicz, [20], combined with its high statistical efficiency and a growing bank of 
policy applications, made this the preferred methodological basis for our study.  
In order to enhance the credibility and robustness of the valuation scenario, the experiment 
focussed upon a highly familiar private good; the household weekly food shopping purchases. 
Specifically subjects were asked valuation questions trading increases in the weekly household 
shopping bill in return for improvements in two health-related attributes of food. After facing 
background questions on food shopping and attitudes to healthy eating, the subjects were 
introduced to the following food-attributes: 
1. the percentage of instances in which UK government samples of supermarket 
food tested positive for pesticide residues; 
2. the percentage of energy obtained from fat for an average UK diet. 
The subjects were given information about the health risks of fat content and pesticide 
residues as well as basic information about current UK average levels for these two attributes. 
They were told that changes in food production methods could alter the values of these two 
attributes. These changes were potentially costly, but they would require no change to food 
shopping habits on the part of consumers. So, for the choices subjects were asked to imagine no 
change to their shopping habits, but to consider reductions in fat content and the level of positive 
tests for pesticide residues10.  
                                                 
9 Sometimes referred to as choice modelling, discrete choice experiments or conjoint analysis. 
10 For example, in the case of fat we stated that: “One way to reduce fat intake would be to 
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Given our focus upon any difference between individual and jointly made estimates of 
household WTP, we wished to avoid other sources of choice complexity and therefore adopted 
arguably the simplest format of CE task, that being a choice between a constant ‘status quo’ (SQ) 
and a varied ‘alternative’ state. Figure 1 shows a typical choice faced by a subject. Here the shaded 
area in the apples showed the percentage of instances in which positive residues for pesticides 
would be found in government tests. Each of the chocolate bars represents approximately the fat 
reduction from a 5% drop in the average energy intake from fat. 
Note that the design and wording of these choices was identical across treatments – both 
groups of respondents were asked “which would you choose?” out of the two options available in 
each choice. The only difference in scripts was that, when couples were interviewed together they 
were told that they had to make an agreed choice. Prior to the choice questions, all respondents 
were reminded that, 
“When you are considering these questions do think carefully about whether your 
household really would prefer to pay for the alternative, or would prefer to continue 
purchasing other things that are important to you. Remember that the costs of the 
alternatives schemes is money which would be coming out your pocket and that would 
mean there would be less money for you to spend on other purchases that you might like to 
make.” 
Attribute levels for the percentage energy intake from fat varied from 40% (the current 
                                                                                                                                                          
encourage food manufacturers to reduce the amount of fat in the food they produce and to 
encourage them to make more ‘low fat’ products. If this was pursued across a wide range of foods, 
fat intake could be reduced without a major change in our shopping habits - the typical shopper 
would continue to buy the same or similar products, but they would contain less fat.” 
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figure) to 35, 30 and 25%.11 Meanwhile, attribute levels for positive tests for pesticides varied 
from 30% (the current figure) to 25, 20 and 15%. Subjects were informed about all the possible 
attribute levels prior to facing the choice questions. Cost levels were £1, £2, £3.5 and £5 per 
capita12 increases in weekly food shopping bills, giving 64 possible alternative consumption 
bundles. Four of these bundles are clearly dominated by the status-quo (i.e. cost increases for no 
changes in consumption). Because we wished to control for all possible interactive effects a full 
factor design was used, with the dominated bundles excluded. Four variants of the questionnaire 
were therefore used, with each subject facing 16 questions and with four questions repeated across 
more than one sub-sample in order to test for order effects in the data. 
 
The utility model. 
Since the status-quo and alternatives differ only in the values of the three attributes, we 
concentrate on utility equations of the basic form: 
υεβββα +++++= jjjjj FATPESTPRICEU 321  
where Uj is the utility of the jth participant, PRICE, PEST and FAT are the values for the 
                                                 
11 At very low levels of fat intake, it becomes difficult to maintain a safe level of intake of all the 
required aspects of the human diet. The consensus (see FAO, 1994 for a set of international 
guidelines based upon nationally produced figures from around the globe) is that this minimum is 
at or below 15% of daily energy intake for an adult. Our range of figures is comfortably above this 
estimate, so that all the reductions in fat intake used in the survey are health risk improvements. 
12 Subjects were asked for their household size prior to starting the interview. Interviewers were 
given questionnaires with cost figures adjusted for household size. For example, if the household 
size was 4, the cost levels seen by the subject would be £4, £8, £14 and £20 respectively. 
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price, pesticide residue and fat content attributes respectively and the random element υ follows an 
extreme value distribution. The coefficients βij have the functional form, 
∑ ++++= ijkjikiFiCiij xFEMALECOUPLE ηβββββ 0  
where COUPLE  is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when a couple were interviewed together, 
FEMALE is a dummy for the case where the woman is interviewed alone, kjx  are the values of the 
other kth characteristic for the subject j. In general we do not have a clear prior for the coefficients 
on the characteristics. For instance, compared to other consumers, regular purchasers of organic 
foods might place a higher weight on the opportunity to obtain a lower level of tested residues in 
the typical food basket. Alternatively, as buyers of foodstuffs which are certified free of non-
organic pesticides, they may place a lower value on pesticide reduction because they are not 
buying the ‘typical’ basket anyway. 
The elements εj, and ηij allow the parameters to be potentially random. We take a normal 
distribution for εj, but choosing a functional form for the ηij is more problematic since we have 
strong priors that βij are negative for PRICE, FAT and PEST. For these variables, if we assume 
that ηij is normally distributed then we face the possibility that for some respondents βij has the 
wrong sign.  
There are two approaches we can take when faced with this problem: since the prime task 
of the research is to compare treatments, we could ignore the sign issue and choose a general form 
even if it produces a large numbers of wrongly-signed coefficients. Alternatively following the 
advice of  Hensher and Greene, [18], we could impose restrictions on the distributional forms for 
ηij that ensure that no individual has an intuitively perverse response to changes in the PRICE, 
FAT and PEST attributes. In practice we plot a course somewhere between these extremes by 
selecting a triangular specification for ηij and imposing the restriction that the triangular 
distribution is bounded by zero.  The restrictions constrain the sign of the coefficient on PRICE, 
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FAT and PEST, though they still allow for perverse effects overall through interaction terms 
between the attributes and the x variables. 
In our questionnaire we have three questions about control of shopping and cooking in the 
household, which ask respondents to identify the pattern of responsibility for food choices, for 
payment for the shopping and for cooking. We use this information to test hypothesis H5. If 
targeting on the basis of answers to the three questions is successful then including variables based 
on these  questions to the estimated model should eliminate the apparent explanatory power of 
knowing whether the respondent was male, female or a couple. Not surprisingly, the answers to 
these three questions are highly correlated (i.e. in the main the person responsible for shopping, 
also tends to pay for it and does the cooking), so we use the question about the identity of the main 
food shopper. For the purposes of estimation this is coded as 1 if the couple were interviewed 
jointly or if the individual interviewed answered that they bore responsibility for food purchase 
decisions. Otherwise the variable was coded as zero and then the dummy was interacted with all 
three attributes. 13 
 
IV Results. 
The sample was constructed from a population of households who had previously agreed to 
be put on a database of potential subjects for experiments and surveys executed by the University 
of East Anglia. All couples on the database were contacted by phone and interviewed at home. 
Prior to the initial phone call, respondents were randomly allocated to one of the two treatments: 
                                                 
13 Note that if no individual states that s/he is the person responsible for shopping (perhaps because 
the responsibility is shared), then the resulting variables would be perfectly collinear with the 
variables that interact couple with the attributes. 
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individual or couple interview. When a household was selected for the individual treatment, the 
conventional survey approach was followed in which a prior rule for choosing one person at 
random for the interview was used. In the couples treatment both partners were interviewed 
together and asked to jointly formulate responses to each choice question.  All subjects were 
interviewed in person at home.14 15 
We recruited 121 couples of whom 70 were interviewed jointly and 28 women were 
interviewed separately. The average age of interviewees was 41.5 with a range from 18 to 75. 
Mean household income was £28,500 (£1 ≈US$1.76 ≈ €1.46) and mean weekly expenditure on 
food was £77 – with a minimum of £20 and a maximum of £200. The distribution of household 
size is illustrated in figure 1 and shows a fairly common preponderance of 2 person households 
with most of the remaining households having 3 or 4 members. No households had more than 6 
members. 
Table 1 summarises some of the information from the questions about fat content in diet.  
[Table 1 about here.] 
Most individuals see themselves and their partners as being at or around average levels of 
fat consumption. However, women perceive themselves as consuming relatively less fat, compared 
to men’s perception of themselves (chi-squared test, p-value = 0.005). There was no statistically 
significant difference between the perception of fat consumption of men made by men and that 
perception made by women (chi-squared test, p-value = 0.13), but there was a statistically 
                                                 
14 In addition a smaller number of subjects were approached in public places. It became apparent 
from feedback from the interviewers that in such public interviews a proper separation of partners 
could not be reliably achieved. As a result we dropped that data from subsequent analysis. 
15 In a few cases, initial questions revealed that the ‘couple’ were not partners, in which case the 
interviewers withdrew. 
  14
significant difference between women’s perception of their relative fat consumption and men’s 
perception of women’s fat intake: men were less likely to perceive their partner’s intake as a little 
below average, but more likely to perceive intake as average or very much below average.  Joint 
interviews yield notable differences in reported consumption. In these interviews, there is still a 
statistically significant difference in perceptions of fat consumption between the genders (chi-
squared test, p-value = 0.02).  
Table 2 summarises some of the household characteristics variables. In this table, Healthy 
and Fat intake are derived variables. In the case of Healthy: for each of six common foods (e.g. 
milk), subjects were asked if they were regular purchasers, infrequent purchasers or never 
purchased low fat varieties (e.g. skimmed or semi-skimmed milk). Subjects received a score of 2 
for each good they purchased regularly and 1 for each foodstuff bought infrequently and the values 
summed over all six goods. The average score was 5.74 per household, indicating that most 
subjects were purchasers of at least some of the goods. For Fat intake we coded each individual as 
1-5 (where 1 = significantly below average fat intake and 5 = significantly above average intake) 
and added the score for the two partners. 16 Around 41% of subjects stated that they were regular 
purchasers of organic foods. Those who did not purchase regularly most commonly stated they 
saw no clear benefits from organic foods. Those who did purchase most commonly stated that it 
tasted better and it was better for the environment. 
 [Table 2 about here.] 
Figure 4 summarises the responsiveness of subjects to the three dimensions of the choice 
problem. For each of the attribute diagrams the values depicted are an unweighted average over all 
                                                 
16 For Healthy, various alternative aggregation methods were used, but none was clearly better 
than this simple total. Similarly with Fat Intake we tried disaggregating by gender, but given the 
high intra-household correlation of the scores this produced no clear improvement over the sum. 
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the values of the other two attributes. This explains the slight upward kink in the diagram for 
pesticides which like the other two, is otherwise downward sloping. 
We tested for order effects and found no evidence of them and so we pool the data from the 
four variants. In the regressions, all of which are estimated using  Halton draws for the simulation 
(Train, [32]), we experimented with a number of specifications, including non-linear interactions 
between the attributes (which turn out to be insignificant) and random parameters for the 
interactions between treatment and attributes (ditto). Some socio-economic variables such as 
education and age tend not to be significant, but in many variants of the model interactive effects 
between Healthy on the one hand and the attributes for fat content and pesticide residues on the 
other hand can be significant. In some alternative specifications, we also find significant 
interactive effects with Organic and Income variables, but for simplicity and to focus on the main 
purpose of the paper, the selected results in Table 3 concentrate on three representative 
equations.17  
The third of these equations (labelled ‘Target’) is the focus of our results and their 
interpretation. It includes the interaction terms between whether the respondent was a decision-
maker (DM) and the three attributes. The other two equations are for comparison. In the model the 
attribute variables, pesticide residues, fat content and price, have negative signs and they are 
highly significant (i.e. at or below the 1% level). The hypothesis that the parameters are not 
random is also rejected at the 1% level for each of the random parameters individually. To 
evaluate whether the equation accords with our priors about the impact of price, pesticide risk and 
fat content, we employ the methods of Train, [32] using the respondent choice data to estimate 
conditional estimates of the marginal impact of changes in price, fat content and pesticide risk for 
                                                 
17 We also try non-interactive dummies for couples and female, but these are not significant in the 
presence of interactive effects. 
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each subject. Overall none of the respondents have an estimated response to the Price attribute that 
is perverse. Four subjects have the unanticipated sign for fat attribute and 13 show a non-negative 
response to the pest attribute in the estimates (the figures are similar for the other equations in 
Table 3).  
We now turn to the impact of the treatments. Out of the parameters for the couples 
treatment, two are significant. A likelihood ratio test rejects the null that collectively the couples 
variables add no explanatory power to the model (p =0.015). Holding everything else constant, 
being interviewed as a couple reduces sensitivity to price and fat content, but reduces it for pest 
residues (compared to a male interviewed individually).  Note though that the net effect of a rise in 
price or fat content is still a reduction in the probability of accepting the alternative at the mean of 
the attribute parameter. The fat and price parameters for the female treatment are significant at the 
1% level or lower and, compared to the men interviewed individually, women are less sensitive to 
changes in the fat and pesticide attributes, but more sensitive than the men to changes in price. 
Collectively the female terms are significant at the 1% level. 
Table 3 here. 
Out of the DM variables, one is significant (pesticide risk), while a likelihood ratio test of 
the joint hypothesis that all parameter values are equal to zero gives a probability value of 0.13, 
suggesting that their joint explanatory power is limited. Comparing the first and third equations to 
understand the impact of adding the DM variables we can see that their main effect is to reduce the 
significance of the couples and female variables, but as we have seen above, not to the extent of 
eliminating the explanatory power of the treatment effects in the Target equation. 
Our discussion so far has centred on the significance of individual coefficients, but of 
course some of the values of the other terms in the estimated equations vary between treatments 
because of difference in the sample values of characteristics. Figure 4 uses the Target equation to 
summarise the marginal impact of changes in the three attributes, evaluated for the three 
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treatments and using average sample values for the relevant characteristics. As can be seen, on 
average the sensitivity to the attributes for couples lies about halfway between that for men and 
women for the Pesticide and Price attributes, but it is the extreme figure (though close to the 
estimate for women) on the Fat attribute. Meanwhile, male sensitivity to the attributes is 
consistently higher than that for women.  
Figure 4 here. 
Figure 5 summarises this information in a slightly different form. For each of the attributes 
in turn, the figure plots the results of a kernel regression using the conditional estimates for the 
marginal impact of changes in the attributes.18 As can be seen, the modes of these plots follow the 
pattern of Figure 4, but the distributions are quite different. 
Figure 5 here. 
The information on the marginal changes in values is summarised also in table 4 where we 
again use the Target equation. For pesticide risk, the marginal values from the three treatments all 
differ from one another at a significance level of 10% or lower. For fat, the male value is 
significantly different from both the couples  and the female value at a 0.1% significance level or 
lower, but the figures for female and couples treatments are not significantly different. The picture 
is similar for the price attribute, where again the male figure is the outlier, differing significantly 
from the values elicited from females and couples.   
Table 4 here. 
For many economists, the marginal willingness to pay figures are potentially of more 
interest than those for marginal values. The right hand side of Table 4 shows the marginal wtp 
values, again calculated using average values for the characteristics on the basis of the Target 
                                                 
18 The smoothing procedure embodied in the kernel regressions leads to the slight exaggeration of 
the numbers of individuals with positive marginal values in the figure. 
  18
equation. The mean wtp values are also compared visually in figure 5. As can be seen, the wtp 
figures for pesticide are similar for male and couples treatments, with both significantly different 
to the figures for women interviewed alone. In fact the figure for women is barely half that for the 
couples interviewed. With fat, there are again major differences between treatments with couples 
having a wtp figure that is only 53% of that for men. This difference is significant (p-value < 
0.001), but the gaps between men and women and between women and couples are not significant. 
Figure 6 here. 
Having summarised the results we consider the performance of our five hypotheses on the 
relationship between individual and collective expressions of wtp. Table 5 presents two-sided 
Wald tests for the five hypotheses and their components. Overall, none of our hypotheses fare 
particularly well: for H1 the null of no difference between treatments is most clearly rejected and 
with it the unitary model. Meanwhile H2, the Bergstrom hypothesis, is rejected for pesticide 
though accepted for fat. H3, arising from some forms of the collective model of the household, 
proposes that household wtp equals the sum of individual wtp, but this rejected for both fat and 
pesticide. H4 supposes that hwtp equals the average figure for iwtp, but again this is clearly 
rejected for both goods. Finally, H5 was the hypothesis that hwtp is equal to the value which 
would be obtained by targeting an identifiable decision-maker. This is rejected at the 1% level for 
pesticide and at the 10% level for fat.  
The immediate cause of this raft of rejections is clear: for each good, the couples treatment 
leads to the extreme outcome, but whereas for the fat attribute couples provide the lowest wtp 
value, with the pesticide risk couples are at the other extreme. A theory that works for one good 
therefore tends to struggle with the other good. We speculate about deeper causes of this result in 
the final section. 
Table 5 here. 
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V Discussion. 
Stated preference methods, as widely used in market research, healthcare evaluation and 
environmental economics are usually based on an unspoken assumption that the identity of the 
person in the household who expresses values does not matter for the calculation of marginal 
values and measures of surplus. In this paper we have examined the issue of whether stated 
valuations are sensitive to the component of the decision-making unit that provides the 
information. Our results suggest that indeed stated willingness to pay figures do depend on 
whether it is the partners or the individuals who provide information on values. However the 
different results for fat and pesticide risk suggest that there is no general rule which governs the 
relationship between the valuations given by the parts of the household and that given by the 
whole.  
We also use data on household responsibilities to test for the efficacy of targeting as a 
strategy to sidestep the problem of interviewing whole households. While this attenuates the gaps 
between household and individual expressions of value, there are still significant differences. 
The differences between the answers given by individuals and those offered by couples 
may arise from a number of factors. As the extensive research in psychology has emphasised (see 
Kerr et al [22] for a survey), the decisions made by groups may not be an average of those made by 
their component individuals. Frequently, groups make more extreme decisions than those made by 
individuals. Bateman and Munro, [5], for instance find couples making more risk averse choices 
when facing tasks together compared to when the partners faced the same decision-making tasks 
alone. Secondly, making choices as a couple offers opportunities for the exchange of information, 
about the good in question, but also about partners’ preferences. This may also be a potential 
source of differences in valuations, particularly when the goods to be valued are unfamiliar.  
Given the previous evidence on income pooling, our results suggest that it would be unwise 
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to assume a unitary household model in stated preference exercises.19 Our work, however does not 
tell us which respondent (individual or household) is the better subject in terms of providing the 
most accurate estimate of revealed household behaviour. Many decisions may not be taken by the 
household collectively – they may be delegated or taken unilaterally by partners. Hence refining 
the practice of stated preference may not only involve delving deeper into the relationship between 
household and individual willingness to pay, but may also require accurate means for predicting 
where in the household behaviourally-relevant values are determined. This remains the subject of 
further work.. 
As a final point, it is also worth noting that in our data we have concentrated on the two 
adult members of the household; in the majority of the sample children were also part of the family 
group and there is plentiful evidence that, at least for some groups, children are influencers of 
household choices. Dosman and Adamowicz, [14], for instance document the profound importance 
of children’s preferences in the choice of holiday destinations. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Our work also suggests that at least in part, the large number of differences in results 
obtained from stated and revealed preference exercises may be down to differences in the identify 
of the decision-maker. 
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Table 1. Perceived energy intake from fat, relative to national average. 
 Individual interviews Joint interviews 
 My intake My partner’s intake  
 Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Very much below average 14% 20% 12% 28% 20% 14% 
A little below average 60% 32% 36% 32% 48% 41% 
About average 20% 44% 40% 32% 28% 30% 
A little above average 6% 0% 8% 4% 3% 12% 
Very much above average 0% 4% 4% 4% 2% 3% 
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Table 2: Household characteristic variables. 
Variable Comment 
Healthy Categorical variable:  
Organic Dummy variable: value = 1 for households which regularly purchase organic 
food. 
Fat intake Categorical variable from 2-10 indicating perceived fat intake of couple relative 
to national average (= 6 on the scale). 
Spending Average weekly expenditure on food shopping (£) 
Income Categorical variable from 1-8 depending on household monthly income 
Education Categorical variable from 1-4 depending on educational level. 
Size Number of individuals regularly living in the household. 
Couple Dummy variable: value = 1 if the interview took place with both partners 
together. 
Female Dummy variable: value =1 if the interview took place with a female partner 
alone. 
DM Dummy for decision maker for food purchases; takes value = 1 if couple 
interviewed together or if individual interviewed and answers that s/he is 
wholly/usually responsible for food shopping decisions. 
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Table 3. Random parameters models. 
 
  No target No couple Target 
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Constant  1.14*** 4.51 1.02*** 4.43 1.06*** 4.34 
Pesticide risk  -0.44*** -9.88 -0.45*** -9.96 -0.44*** -8.92 
Fat content  -0.31*** -6.96 -0.23*** -5.25 -0.27*** -5.81 
Price  -0.91*** -12.12 -0.71*** -12.66 -0.77*** -11.28 
Pesticide risk x Couple -0.01 -0.17 -0.09 -1.21 
Fat content x Couple 0.19*** 4.91 0.17*** 2.66 
Price x Couple 0.25*** 3.25 0.25* 1.92 
Pesticide risk x Female 0.08 1.51 0.13*** 2.74 0.06 1.07 
Fat content x Female 0.16*** 3.07 0.05 1.41 0.16*** 2.78 
Price x Female 0.42*** 4.22 0.23*** 3.37 0.38*** 3.84 
Price x (Size-2) -0.07* -1.87 -0.16*** -5.50 -0.18*** -6.24 
Pesticide risk x Healthy 0.02*** 3.87 0.01 1.67 0.01 1.49 
Fat content x Healthy -0.01 -1.26 -0.02*** -2.85 -0.02*** -2.82 
        
Pesticide risk xDM 0.15*** 3.29 0.21*** 3.28 
Fat xDM 0.18*** 4.57 0.05 0.92 
Price xDM 0.17*** 2.89 0.01 0.10 
Scale factors Constant 1.35*** 5.56 0.56* 1.83 0.71*** 2.34 
Pesticide risk 0.44*** 9.88 0.45*** 9.96 9.96*** 8.92 
 Fat content 0.31*** 6.96 0.23*** 5.25 0.27*** 5.81 
 Price 0.91*** 12.12 0.71*** 12.66 0.77*** 11.28 
    
    
Log-likelihood (LL) -748 -750.4 -745.19  
LR test 1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000  
LR test 2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; p-values are for chi-squared statistics; DM = 
decision maker; LR = likelihood ratio; LR test 1: no coefficients; LR test 2: no 
randomness in parameters,  
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Table 4. Comparisons of marginal values and marginal wtp (targeted equation). 
 Coefficients Marginal WTP 
Pesticide Female Male Couple Female Male Couple 
Values -0.113  -0.354 -0.262 0.211 
(0.079) 
0.384 
(0.053) 
0.398 
(0.040) 
Wald tests.       
Versus male (p-value) 0.000***   0.054*   
Versus Couple (p-value) 0.005*** 0.072*  0.030** 0.820  
       
Fat       
Values  -0.150 -0.352 -0.133 0.281 
(0.077) 
0.382 
(0.044) 
0.201 
(0.036) 
Wald tests.       
Versus Male (p-value) 0.001***   0.243   
Versus Couple (p-value) 0.725 0.000***  0.329 0.000***  
       
Price       
Values  -0.534 -0.921 -0.660    
       
Wald tests.       
Versus Male (p-value) 0.000***      
Versus Couple (p-value) 0.188 0.000***     
(standard errors in parentheses) 
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Table 5.  Wald Tests of hypotheses (p-values). 
Hypothesis. Pesticide  Fat  
H1A. iwtpf= hwtp 0.030** 0.243 
H1A iwtpm= hwtp 0.820 0.000*** 
H1B iwtpf= iwtpm 0.054* 0.329 
H2 hwtp=min(iwtpm , iwtpf) 0.030** 0.243 
H3 hwtp=(iwtpm + iwtpf) 0.053* 0.000*** 
H4. hwtp = 0.5(iwtpm + iwtpf) 0.009*** 0.090* 
H5: hwtp = (iwtpT) 0.007** 0.10* 
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   ‘No Change’ ‘Alternative A’ 
Percentage of positive 
tests for pesticides in 
food 
 30% 
 
15% 
 
Percentage average 
fat content in food 
 40% 
  
  
 
25% 
 
  
 
 
Addition to your 
weekly household 
food shopping bill 
 £0 £4.00 
  Choose 
‘No Change’ 
Choose 
Alternative A 
Which would you 
choose? 
(tick one box only) 
    
Figure 1. A Typical Choice Question 
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Figure 2 Household size. 
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Figure 3 Sensitivity to the attributes (whole sample). 
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Figure 4. Absolute Marginal values 
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Figure 5.  Fitted Conditional Distributions of Marginal values (Price, Pesticide and Fat) 
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Figure 6.  Marginal willingness to pay (£ per week per percentage point).  
 
